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ESSAY

The Alien Tort Statute as Transnational Law
JAYE ELLIS†

INTRODUCTION
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.1 presented the U.S.
Supreme Court with the opportunity to examine two of the most
fraught issues regarding the Alien Tort Statute (ATS): 2 the question
of corporate responsibility, and the suitability of U.S. courts as fora
for cases in which the plaintiff and defendant are foreign and the acts
complained of took place in another jurisdiction—the so-called
―foreign-cubed‖ cases.3 It also presented the Court with the
opportunity, which was not taken up, to position itself as a
transnational actor speaking to a series of publics located both within
and outside of the United States. More specifically, the ATS could be
regarded as a point of intersection between domestic and
international law, and the nature of the relationship between these
two bodies of law could have been analyzed anew.
This Essay will begin with an analysis of recent literature on
transnational law, focusing in particular on the contributions of
scholars associated with International Institutional Law (IIL) and
Global Administrative Law (GAL).4 After a brief discussion of the
unusual history of the ATS, notably its long period of dormancy, the
issues of corporate liability and foreign-cubed cases will be
†
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Michael Belecky and Dominic DiFruscio for their invaluable research assistance and
Frédéric Bachand, Fabien Gélinas, Michael J. Kelly, Geneviève Saumier, and the editors for
their helpful suggestions and comments.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. See Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal
Securities Class Actions, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES (Number B1442) 91, 96 (Practising L. Inst. ed., 2004) (using the term ―foreign-cubed‖ to describe suits
involving a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant company, and a foreign market).
4. See infra Part I.
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examined, primarily from the point of view of international and
transnational law.5 I conclude that, though trying the Kiobel case in
the United States would be problematic from the point of view of
international law rules on extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction,
literature on transnational law suggests other means of protecting
some of the most important interests that international rules on
extraterritorial jurisdiction were crafted to promote.6
I.

APPROACHES TO PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
SPACE

The various bodies of scholarship associated with transnational
law deny a sharp rupture between the national and the international.
The space with which these scholars are concerned is not defined by
state borders, though these are taken into account. Actors and issues
cross these borders, and therefore legal rules, and the decisionmaking instances that interpret and apply them must attempt to
follow. The arguments have descriptive and normative aspects: it is
observed that actors, fora, or bodies of rules straddle or move across
international boundaries, limiting the utility of heavily state-centric,
jurisdiction-based accounts of law and politics. As a result, it is
argued, boundaries and borders should be made more porous, and the
movement of legal norms across jurisdictional boundaries should be
accepted or even encouraged.7 The bodies of scholarship with which
this Essay is concerned, GAL and IIL, observe the increasing impact
of international law and foreign domestic law on actors that may not
be well positioned to prepare for and respond to these impacts, as
well as conflicts between different bodies of law and different
administrative authorities. Perhaps the most notorious example is the
Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council, which
is responsible for identifying potential or actual terrorists. 8 Actors are
increasingly subject to rules and procedures that arise and operate in
unexpected places. The standards to which these procedures are
5. See infra Parts II–III.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
LAW BEYOND BORDERS 10 (2012) (arguing for the creation of a shared legal space that
would allow for the interaction of domestic legal norms across borders to resolve
transnational problems).
8. See Clemens A. Feinäugle, The UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban
Sanctions Committee: Emerging Principles of International Institutional Law for the
Protection of Individuals?, in THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 101 (Armin von Bogdandy
et al. eds., 2010).
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subject, particularly at the international level, are often not
particularly robust, and may be applied with little rigor. In many
jurisdictions, domestic courts, tribunals, and administrative agencies
strive to meet very high standards of rigor and fairness, and foreign
actors subject to their jurisdiction often have little cause for
complaint on this score. However, when the decision-making
instance takes too parochial a view, not seeking to understand the
difficulties that foreign parties before it may face, and failing to
appreciate the risks inherent in applying laws across borders,
significant problems may be encountered.
Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann
have developed the concept of the international public authority,
which they define as ―any kind of governance activity by
international institutions, be it administrative or intergovernmental,
. . . if it determines [identifies and enforces the rights and obligations
of] individuals, private associations, enterprises, states, or other
public institutions.‖9 They point to two important features of public
law: first, public authority must always be exercised in virtue of
public law (constitutional or administrative); second, the exercise of
public authority is subject to substantive and procedural standards
found in public law.10 A public authority is international, according
to the authors, if it is ―exercised on the basis of a competence
instituted by a common international act of public authorities, mostly
states, to further a goal which they define, and are authorized to
define, as a public interest.‖11 The authors accept that a nongovernmental actor can, under certain conditions, act as a functional
equivalent of an international public authority, and therefore should
be included in the definition on this basis.12
A similar approach is adopted by Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch, and Richard Stewart, who argue for the existence of a global
administrative space in which emerging principles of global
administrative law operate.13 Bogdandy does not adopt the
9. Armin von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public International Law:
Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GER. L.J. 1375, 1376
(2008).
10. Id. at 1380.
11. Id. at 1383.
12. See id. at 1384.
13. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 26 (2005).
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boundaries around either the relevant space, type of governmental
activity, or type of legal rule imposed by the term ―administrative,‖14
and these limitations are unnecessary for my purposes as well.
However, the definition of a global administrative body adopted by
Kingsbury et al. is in important respects broader, encompassing not
just international bodies, but also informal networks and coordination
arrangements, national and public-private regulatory bodies, and, in
some cases, private regulatory bodies.15
A third source of inspiration is Jeremy Waldron’s approach to
―publicness,‖ which is developed at the international level by
Kingsbury and Donaldson.16 Waldron describes this public character
of law as lying in ―the fact that law presents itself not just as a set of
commands by the powerful [or] a set of rules recognized among an
elite, but as a set of norms made publicly and issued in the name of
the public . . . that ordinary people can in some sense appropriate as
their own, qua members of the public.‖17 Kingsbury and Donaldson
acknowledge the difficulties of transposing this approach to
publicness to the international level, where law-making is democratic
in only a very thin sense, and where the identification of a public to
which a given rule is addressed is extremely difficult.18 They do,
however, find utility in the concept.19
My own approach to public authority in transnational legal space
borrows heavily from those described above. I refer to transnational
rather than international public authority; I define transnational space
and transnational law as encompassing global administrative law, but
not only that law. I include in my definition of transnational public
authorities domestic actors such as regulatory agencies and courts,
and some private actors. On this definition, U.S. courts applying the
ATS most certainly qualify as transnational public authorities.
Two implications will be discussed in this Essay. First, the
audience to which U.S. courts ought to address themselves when
14. See von Bogdandy et. al, supra note 9, at 1914–15.
15. Kingsbury et al., supra note 13, at 17.
16. Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, From Bilateralism to Publicness in
International Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 79 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (adopting the ideas of
publicness espoused by Jeremy Waldron). See generally Jeremy Waldron, Can There Be a
Democratic Jurisprudence?, 58 EMORY L.J. 675 (2009) (discussing the concept of
publicness).
17. Waldron, supra note 16, at 684.
18. See Kingsbury & Donaldson, supra note 16, at 84.
19. See id.
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interpreting and applying the ATS will be a transnational audience
made up of multiple publics that are implicated or stand to be
affected by the courts’ decisions. Second, the rules which U.S. courts
ought to regard as relevant to the resolution of the case will not be
limited to international and U.S. rules, but may well include a range
of procedural and substantive rules that operate in transnational space
to discipline the exercise of transnational public authority.
II. LOHENGRIN IN TRANSNATIONAL SPACE
The ATS emerged in a very different legal, social, and cultural
environment than that of the current day, and it points in the direction
of a possible future environment that is also very different. Little is
known about the intent of the drafters of the ATS, though certain
fairly reliable conclusions can be reached based on the contemporary
state of international law, diplomacy, and relations, among other
factors.20 We have a fairly good idea of the evil that the statute was
intended to address, namely the prospect of foreign victims of
wrongful acts abroad—probably committed by American citizens or
agents—having their reasonable expectation of access to U.S. courts
to seek redress denied, thus leading to potential diplomatic incidents
and reputational damage to the United States.21 As with any legal
instrument, we would not be surprised to see this statute being used
for different purposes and in different contexts as society changes
over time. However, because of the long period of dormancy of the
statute, we do not have the benefit of a gradual evolution in the
manner in which and the purposes for which the statute was used.22
The statute is, in many respects, even more of a foreign body than a
rule imported from another jurisdiction: when foreign rules are
imported, observers have access to extensive information regarding
the reasons why the law takes the form that it does, including the
manner in which it evolved over time. Interpreting and applying the
ATS in the present day therefore allows—indeed requires—a good
deal of creativity.

20. See generally William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1995) (providing
an overview of the history of the ATS and various theories on its historical roots).
21. See id. at 231.
22. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (noting that
prior to 1960, the statute had been invoked just once in the previous 167 years).
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The ATS presents an excellent opportunity to connect U.S. law
with both international and transnational law. Regarding international
law, the statute can be seen as an invitation to U.S. courts to make
good on the proposition in the Charming Betsy and Paquete Habana
cases regarding the status of international law within the United
States.23 As Harold Koh has argued, reference by U.S. courts to
foreign and international law—transnational jurisprudence—serves
many important purposes, which he summarizes as ―advanc[ing] the
broader development of a well-functioning international judicial
system.‖24 Koh describes transnational jurisprudence as an expression
of U.S. sovereignty through ―vigorous participation in the various
regimes that regulate and order the international system.‖25 This
appears to be very closely aligned with at least some of the purposes
behind the ATS when it was originally adopted.
In a case like Kiobel, the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision
will be felt as much abroad as at home, if not more so. A question
raised by this and other foreign-cubed cases is whether U.S. courts
should play the role of enforcers at large of international law. There
are many good reasons, even from the point of view of transnational
law, why the courts should hesitate to do so, as I discuss below.26 On
the positive side of the ledger, the ATS has the potential to provide to
transnational society a potentially useful and effective
implementation tool, something that public international law, and
particularly international human rights law, is lacking.27 The statute
has the effect of transforming U.S. courts from domestic to
transnational fora, whether they see themselves in this light or not.

23. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (―[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains . . . .‖); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (―[W]here there
is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .‖).
24. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43,
53–54 (2004); see also Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law: A
Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 187, 195 (2001); Andrea Bianchi, International
Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 751, 753 (2004).
25. Koh, supra note 24, at 56 (quoting ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27
(1995)).
26. See infra note 73–74 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
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III. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS
Two main questions arise regarding corporate liability under the
ATS. (1) Is the question whether corporations can be sued in virtue of
the ATS to be decided in light of domestic or international law?
(2) What does the relevant body of law have to say on the matter?
Even if one concludes that U.S. law does or should determine the
matter, the position in international and comparative law, given the
peculiar nature of the ATS, remains highly relevant. The audience
that U.S. courts ought to have in mind when framing their judgments
in ATS cases is a transnational one, and, with respect to the Kiobel
case, a very broad and diverse one.28 As a result, it seems appropriate
for the Supreme Court to seek either to explain how its conclusion
accords with broader trends in international and foreign law, or why
it takes a different tack. More specifically, the Court needs to explain
why (1) corporations are proper defendants in cases like Kiobel, and
(2) why foreign corporations are proper defendants before U.S. courts
in such cases. This second question will be discussed below in the
section on foreign-cubed cases;29 I now turn to the first.
With respect to the first question, two factors seem pertinent.
First, the proposition that an individual could hold obligations under
international law and be subject to the jurisdiction of an international
court became a widely-recognized international rule through a series
of decisions made by a collection of scholars and government
officials at Nuremberg.30 It was not a feature of international law
before this moment. It entered into the corpus of international rules in
a highly unorthodox fashion, and it became available as a result of
the extraordinary set of circumstances in place at the close of World
War II. To put it simply, the argument was made, and accepted, that
individuals should face criminal liability before the courts at
Nuremberg and others like them.31 The reasons why corporations

28. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs-AppellantsCross-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv); Jonathan A.
Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What
Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1098 (2009); Michael J. Kelly,
Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide Under International Law, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
339, 343–44 (2012).
31. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars, supra note 30, at 2–3.
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were not seen as appropriate defendants at Nuremberg are historically
contingent, and ought not to be seen as standing for the proposition
that corporations cannot be liable at international law. It is true that
no corporate entities were tried at Nuremberg, but such trials were
contemplated and some indictments carefully prepared, as Jonathan
A. Bush demonstrates in his sweeping study of corporate liability and
liability for conspiracy at Nuremberg.32 Among the reasons which
Bush identifies to explain the fact that no corporations (and few
business leaders, for that matter33) were indicted include the impact
of the larger issue of reinvigorating the German economy;34
assumptions about the division of labor between the Allied trial effort
and German courts;35 the difficulties that the charge of conspiracy
encountered;36 perceptions that indictments against individuals would
send a stronger message than indictments against corporations;37
practical difficulties of disentangling often deliberately complicated
corporate structures;38 and lack of time and resources.39 Bush, in
summarizing his findings, states ―corporate and associational
criminal liability was seriously explored, and was never rejected as
legally unsound.‖40
Another argument in favor of the proposition that corporations
can owe obligations at international law and can be held responsible
for their breach is that they already do, in some measure.41 Contracts
between corporations and governments generally contain choice-oflaw clauses, and in some cases one of the bodies of law that is
identified as governing the contractual relations between the parties is
international law.42 In international arbitrations, for instance,
32. Bush, supra note 30, at 1150–58, 1199–200.
33. Id. at 1233.
34. Id. at 1117–23.
35. Id. at 1133–34.
36. Id. at 1162–63.
37. Id. at 1168–69.
38. Id. at 1176–77, 1198.
39. Id. at 1215.
40. Id. at 1239.
41. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 232 (2007) (discussing how contracts between developing states and
corporations endow corporations with international legal personality); see also Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1977)
(finding an arbitral clause between Texaco and Libya Arab Republic enforceable).
42. While parties choose state law to govern the vast majority of contracts, the
International Chamber of Commerce identified that ―national rules or principles‖ were
chosen as the governing body of law in two percent of contracts in 2011. 23 INT’L CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 14 (2012); see also
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corporations have benefitted from the application of the international
legal standard regarding the payment of compensation for
expropriation. They have also avoided the application of domestic
legislation, adopted in the context of nationalization of certain
industry sectors, that establishes the criteria and standards for the
payment of compensation. One can argue that these cases are
different from the present case. For example, full subjects of
international law are able to participate, at least in theory, in the
crafting of legal rules; corporations do not have this ability, so they
have no influence over the content of international human rights and
other norms that may come to be imposed on them. In the
commercial setting, although corporations do not participate in the
drafting of international legal rules, they do have some control over
the law to which they are subject in the context of the negotiation of
the terms of the contract.43 If they deem international law to be highly
unfavorable to their interests, they can propose to their contractual
partner that another body of law be identified to govern their
relations.44 Finally, these contracts are not subject to the control of
public international courts and tribunals, but rather arbitral tribunals,
so one might take issue with the proposition that corporations are
already subject to international law.45 It nevertheless remains true that
corporations benefit from the application of international norms in
certain cases; fairness would suggest that they also be bound by
norms of international law.
Similar arguments, based on democratic principles, are made in
the context of international criminal law. Defendants are subject to
international rules, despite the fact that they have no access to
PAUL D. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 183 (2d ed.
2007).
43. See Commission Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community Instrument and its
Modernisation, at 22, COM (2002) 654 final (Jan. 14, 2003) (―It is common practice in
international trade for the parties to refer not to the law of one or other state but direct to the
rules of an international convention such as the Vienna Convention of 11 April 1980 on
contracts for the international sale of goods, to the customs of international trade, to the
general principles of law, to the lex mercatoria or to recent private codifications such as the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.‖).
44. See JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARBITRATION AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 45
(2001).
45. See JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (2d ed. 2008); TIBOR VÁRADY
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 97 (4th
ed. 2009).
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international law-making processes.46 However, these international
rules are well entrenched internationally and domestically. Great care
is taken to ensure that defendants will not be subject to rules which
did not exist at the time they were alleged to have committed a
violation.47 An identical safeguard exists in the ATS, reinforced by
jurisprudence: the international norm whose violation is complained
of must be ―specific, universal, and obligatory.‖48 Because of the
notoriety of the international norms to which the ATS applies, ATS
defendants cannot claim ignorance of the law.
IV. FOREIGN-CUBED CASES: CAN U.S. COURTS BE FORUM
CONVENIENS?
There are many other reasons why a transnational audience
might be highly skeptical of the ATS, particularly in foreign-cubed
cases. Some of these arguments can be dismissed out of hand. For
example, there is the proposition that courts should not steal a march
on public authorities responsible for the conduct of foreign relations,
and should therefore not take positions on breaches of international
law that foreign actors commit.49 This argument applies with
somewhat more force when courts are commenting, directly or
indirectly, on the conduct of foreign governments, as opposed to
private actors. It has been difficult for the courts that have considered
Kiobel to avoid sustained analysis of the actions of government
officials in Nigeria.50 Arguably, it is better to leave such matters to
the U.S. government, which may have reasons of its own for staying
silent in the face of these alleged violations of international law.51
46. See Paola Gaeta, The History and the Evolution of the Notion of International
Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE
TO ITS REVIEW 170 (Roberto Bellelli ed., 2010).
47. Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (establishing that the International Criminal Court ―has jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute‖).
48. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994).
49. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity
as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 62–78 (2010); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 516 (1997).
50. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013)
(discussing the alleged actions of the Nigerian government).
51. See Bradley, supra note 49, at 516. But see Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2011) (―The assumption that
Congress generally legislates with only domestic concerns in mind may comport with
common sense when Congress uses unilateral sources of lawmaking power. But it does not
have the same intuitive strength when Congress uses multilateral sources rooted in
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However, this kind of argument flies in the face of the rule of law,
which requires that courts be able to freely identify the failings of
government. If the U.S. government chooses not to take up the
plaintiffs’ cause, that is no reason for the court to decide not to make
itself available to the plaintiffs. It can be argued that the rule of law is
not implicated in cases involving international law and foreign
plaintiffs, defendants, and/or acts. The international realm might be
seen not as a realm for the rule of law, but rather for Realpolitik;
governments need to be left significant margins of maneuver to
pursue the national interest without being unduly hampered by rule of
law or democratic principles. However, a transnational law approach
resists a clear division between a realm of law (the domestic sphere)
and a realm of politics (the international sphere). There is, rather,
transnational space, which is host to both law and politics.
Furthermore, a transnational law approach resists the notion that law
is contained within jurisdictional boundaries. These boundaries are
not unimportant, but they are highly porous and, in many cases, of
limited relevance.
The foreign-cubed cases do raise genuine concerns, however,
relating to rule of law, democratic principles, self-determination, and
similar concepts and principles. Democratic principles demand that
subjects of rules have some means of influencing the content and
nature of those rules, if not directly, then indirectly through the
exercise of democratic rights.52 Principles of fair procedure demand
that parties before decision-making bodies or adjudicative instances
have adequate opportunities and means to gather information for the
purposes of representing their interests, to respond to arguments or
charges, to understand the proceedings and operate within procedural
frameworks, to receive advice or be represented by an advocate, and
to overcome language barriers.53 These types of problems can be
encountered in any number of domestic settings, of course, but they
are most likely to arise in transnational cases. The risks in Kiobel are
probably fairly low, both because the defendant is a transnational
international law, which by its nature deals with relations with foreign nations and norms
shared with those nations.‖ (footnote omitted)).
52. See Waldron, supra note 16, at 688 (―[A democrat] believes that in principle
everyone who stands to be governed by a given norm if it is adopted has the right to
participate on equal terms in determining whether it should be adopted [and] that every
society should set up political institutions that embody this principle and should seek to
reform or subordinate decision-making institutions that operate on any other basis.‖).
53. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 13, at 37–39.
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actor par excellence, well equipped to move from one jurisdiction to
another, and because much of the law to which it is subject is
universally applicable international law. Nevertheless, the manner in
which the case proceeds ought to be measured against a set of
transnational standards, such as those that GAL and ILL scholars
have begun to identify. The application of such standards need not
lead to the conclusion that foreign-cubed cases should never be tried.
Rather, the principle might be that, where the transnational standards
are likely not to be met, courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction,
unless no other suitable forum seems to present itself and reasonable
efforts are made to protect the interests of foreign parties.
The rules whose breach is alleged in Kiobel are extremely wellrecognized rules of customary international law, applicable to all
states.54 They are also reflected in domestic law around the world—
not, unfortunately, on a universal basis, and, as this case evidences,
often more honored in the breach than in the observance. It is true
that subjecting an actor to rules adopted through processes over
which it had no influence or control poses difficulties from the point
of view of democratic principles.55 But rules of customary
international law do not suffer as much from this democratic deficit
due to their gradual emergence through the convergence of practice
and opinion, and their closer relationship with developments in
domestic law.56 I have argued elsewhere that the extraterritorial
application of a highly complex regulatory regime may be in tension
with democratic principles,57 but the international norms at play in
Kiobel are of a very different nature.
Seizure of jurisdiction by a U.S. court in a foreign-cubed case is
not consonant with the rules of public international law governing the
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.58 U.S. courts, however, very
54. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (5th ed. 2003); ALEXANDER
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–60 (2006). See generally
Lisa Yarwood, Jus Cogens: Useful Tool or Passing Fancy? A Modest Attempt at Definition,
38 BRACTON L.J. 16 (2006) (examining the historical development of jus cogens norms).
55. See Waldron, supra note 16, at 688.
56. This is due to the very nature of custom, which represents the gradual accretion of
state practice. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 157–69 (2d ed. 2005).
57. See Jaye Ellis, Extraterritorial Exercise of Jurisdiction for Environmental
Protection: Addressing Fairness Concerns, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 397 (2012).
58. These principles are: (1) the territoriality principle (the state on whose territory the
alleged act, or part of the act, occurred has jurisdiction); (2) the nationality principle (the
state whose national carried out an act has jurisdiction); (3) the passive personality principle
(the state whose national was the victim of an act has jurisdiction); (4) the protective
principle (states have jurisdiction acts of counterfeiting or treason that directly affect their
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rarely refer to these principles. Instead, U.S. courts have developed a
peculiarly U.S. approach to the question, even though judges
generally claim to be applying international and not domestic rules.59
The only principle that permits the exercise of jurisdiction where
there is no nexus to the forum is the principle of universal
jurisdiction, which applies to a narrow category of international
norms.60 Two of the norms invoked in Kiobel, crimes against
humanity and torture, fall within this category; the others probably do
not.61 The ATS is restrictive as to the international rules that can be
pleaded in U.S. courts, but not as restrictive as the principle of
universal jurisdiction would require. The question then arises whether
the United States should prefer the restrictive approach currently in
place in international law, or whether the international rules on
extraterritoriality are too narrow and ought to be rethought.
Rules governing the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction were
developed to protect the sovereignty of states,62 which is in turn one
means—a rather blunt instrument, it is true—for preserving selfdetermination, democratic principles, and pluralism. States are meant
to refrain from imposing their own legal and political frameworks on
other states or on foreign nationals, and the rules on extraterritoriality
exist, at least in part, to make it more difficult for states to do so.63
The appropriate means for imposing rules on states is seen to be the
development of international law, with the participation and consent
of states. In a context in which transnational interactions come to be
the norm, however, the rules on extraterritoriality require reexamination. In particular, their raison d’être must be subject to
national interest). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 cmts. c, e–g (1987).
59. Ellis, supra note 57.
60. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J.
INT’L L. 149, 150–51 (2006).
61. Plaintiffs also brought claims of extrajudicial killing; arbitrary arrest and detention;
violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; forced exile; and property
destruction. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). For a
discussion of what constitutes a ―universal crime,‖ see Colangelo, supra note 60, at 151.
62. See SHAW, supra note 54, at 574–75; SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF
LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 3–4 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2011) (1933). See
generally Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli:
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2007)
(discussing the historical development of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
63. See Colangelo, supra note 60, at 157–61 (examining the interplay between
jurisdiction and state sovereignty).
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critical appraisal, and we must ask whether there are other means to
achieve some or all of the purposes of these rules in a manner better
adapted to law in a transnational setting. Space does not permit a
thorough discussion of these questions here; instead, I will outline
some of the key questions that the Kiobel case raises.
I have already discussed the fact that the substantive rules being
invoked are international, not U.S., law, as well as the fact that the
defendant has the necessary resources to adequately defend itself
before U.S. courts. The procedural rules to which the defendant was
subject are part of U.S. law, and one would need to inquire whether
this would lead to unfairness or hardship for the defendant. However,
there are stakeholders beyond the parties to this case, notably the
Ogoni and other groups in Nigeria; the Nigerian government;
corporations operating offshore, particularly in states with weak
democratic and rule of law frameworks; and the governments and
populations of those states.64 The facts alleged in this case took place
far away from U.S. courts, in a context with which U.S. lawyers and
judges are not likely to be familiar. Practical problems of gathering
and analyzing evidence, including witness testimony, were present.65
Lack of knowledge of factors such as law, politics, culture,
geography, language, and economic conditions, would have
hampered efforts to understand what happened, how, and why. The
current rules on extraterritoriality do not permit the avoidance of such
problems in that they do permit transnational cases under a range of
circumstances. The difficulties, practical and sociological, that these
cases present must be taken in stride and addressed to the extent that
it is possible to do so.
One strategy for bringing the ATS into line with public
international law as it currently stands would be to push for a
broadening of the violations for which universal jurisdiction is
accepted. The success of this venture is highly uncertain, however,
and points to a subtle difference between international and
transnational law. Under international law, state consent is generally
64. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1162–63 (describing the factual background of the case).
65. Cf. Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non
Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1001, 1062–63 (2001)
(noting the burdens that foreign cases pose for U.S. courts, including the difficulties in ruling
on documentary evidence written in a foreign language and producing witnesses from
foreign countries); Matthew R. Skolnik, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in
Alien Tort Claims Act Cases: A Shell of Its Former Self After Wiwa, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
187, 189, 202 (2002) (discussing the private interest factors, such as availability of evidence,
that courts consider in determining whether forum non conveniens should be invoked).
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regarded as fundamental to the creation and modification of
international norms, though there are various problems with this
position from both practical and normative perspectives. In the
context of transnational law, however, pluralism is the order of the
day.66 Scholars associated with transnational law either accept or
embrace fragmentation in international law, acknowledging that the
multiple sites of decision-making and dispute resolution operating in
transnational space will often be in tension, if not in conflict, with
one another.67 Fragmentation and decentralization mean that, in a
great many cases, there will be no higher authority available to
resolve such conflicts by deciding which authority has jurisdiction
and under which body of rules. The resolution of these tensions and
conflicts must be addressed locally, through mutual observance and
interactions. At first, public authorities are likely to proceed on a
case-by-case basis, seeking approaches that address the main issues
raised in a particular context. Over time, particularly where public
authorities interact frequently, a body of rules that Andreas FischerLescano and Gunther Teubner describe as ―inter-systemic conflict
laws‖68 will emerge, in an incremental, inductive fashion.69
In more concrete terms, U.S. courts interpreting and applying the
ATS could act in cases in which international law would not
necessarily recognize its jurisdiction without offending against the
broader aims of international (and transnational) law. This would
involve, as discussed above, an assumption of the role of
transnational public authority, speaking to a range of publics that are
concerned with or affected by the range of issues raised in Kiobel and
cases like it. It would also involve taking seriously the objectives that
66. See BERMAN, supra note 7, at 10–11 (proposing a pluralist approach to transnational
law as opposed to approaches which seek universality or the reimposition of ―territorial
insularity‖).
67. See Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
247, 258–61 (2006) (describing how tension between WTO regulation and the Biosafety
Protocol’s competing regime has led to fragmentation).
68. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1000 (2004)
(citing GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth
Adler trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., Blackwell 1993)).
69. See Krisch, supra note 67, at 278 (explaining that stability in a pluralist order is
created over time); see also Nico Krisch, Pluralism in Global Risk Regulation: The Dispute
over GMOs and Trade 8–16 (LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 17/2009, 2009)
(describing the development of such conflict laws in the context of laws relating to
Genetically Modified Organisms).
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lie behind the international law principles on extraterritorial exercises
of jurisdiction, and seeking to mitigate some of the disadvantages of
litigation before a foreign court. An excellent starting point in this
respect is the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, which focuses on prescriptive jurisdiction, but which
nevertheless provides a highly pertinent set of considerations that
courts could usefully take into account.70 Among these considerations
are links between the activity and regulated actors, on the one hand,
and the regulating state, on the other. It is generally acknowledged
that these links are weak in the Kiobel case.71 It then falls to be
considered whether there are other factors that might overcome this
problem. The Restatement makes reference to the ―character of the
activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulations is generally
accepted.‖72 Here, the argument in favor of exercise of jurisdiction is
much stronger. When one also takes into consideration the
Restatement’s reference to justified expectations that might be
affected by the regulation, and the importance of the regulation
internationally,73 the case for the exercise of jurisdiction seems
stronger. Regarding a further factor, compatibility of the regulation
―with the traditions of the international system,‖74 there are
arguments in both directions. On one hand, as noted, many of the
allegations made in Kiobel do not refer to norms for which universal
jurisdiction is generally recognized, so the exercise of jurisdiction in
this case could be in tension with international norms.75 On the other
hand, the substantive international rules that are invoked here are all
well recognized and well entrenched in international law, and in
many domestic legal systems as well.76

70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987).
71. Paul Hoffman, who argued the case on behalf of the petitioners, acknowledged
during the second oral argument, ―the only connection between the events in Nigeria and the
United States is that the plaintiffs are now living in the United States and have asylum
because of those events, and the defendants are here. There’s no other connection between
the events that took place . . . in Nigeria and the forum.‖ Transcript of Oral Reargument at 4,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2)(c) (1987).
73. Id. § 403(2)(d)–(e).
74. Id. § 403(2)(f).
75. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 54–55.
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What can be done about the inevitable strong disagreement
within and among the many publics interested in or affected by the
Kiobel case? How might the Supreme Court react to the many and
varied voices who will claim that it got the case wrong? The Justices
could learn a good deal from the arguments that will inevitably be
expressed about the Court’s decision, and they should watch carefully
how other transnational legal authorities address similar questions.77
There is no reason to believe that these processes of mutual
observation and these attempts by public authorities to influence one
another will lead to consensus, or even an agreement to disagree. But
this process has some potential to guard against excessively generous
or restrictive interpretations about the appropriate scope of
jurisdiction under the ATS.
CONCLUSION
The Kiobel case, and the ATS more generally, are important
points of contact between U.S. and international law, and provided an
excellent opportunity for U.S. courts to adopt a more open,
collaborative rapport with international and foreign law. The power
and influence exercised by the U.S. and its institutions in the world
cannot be ignored, and the ATS provides opportunities for U.S.
courts to promote, perhaps in a punctual and rather haphazard
fashion, the implementation and enforcement of international legal
norms. It also creates the risk of the imposition of uniquely U.S.
approaches to international legal issues on various actors in
transnational space. The concept of the transnational public authority
provides a potential framework within which to think through both
the potential dangers and possible avenues to their mitigation.

77. See generally Iman Prihandono, Barriers to Transnational Human Rights Litigation
Against Transnational Corporations (TNCs): The Need for Cooperation Between Home and
Host Countries, 3 J.L. & CONFLICT RESOL. 89, 92–96 (2011) (surveying transnational
litigation against corporate actors in Canada, United Kingdom, European Union, and
Australia).

